A Project into Psycholinguistics
A Project into Psycholinguistics
From the Language of Children, to the Language of Chimps
By Delphie Levy Jones
The potential ‘whys’ and ‘hows’ of a
child’s first language acquisition, over centuries, have been thoroughly
debated. The extent to which this acquisition occurs, in this question, depends
on the exploration of innate and learnt behavioural factors. These draw upon
concepts from two main linguistic perspectives, Nativism and Behaviourism, and
from these, other theories and ideas develop. The wider debate of human
behaviour, including language acquisition, can be used to help us breakdown the
question, where this debate is observed in many broader fields of study (philosophical
and scientific to name a few), as ‘Nature vs Nurture’.
For child language acquisition to
be considered innate, we have to understand language as part of the human
phenotype. This simply names the phenomenon of what it means to be human.
Language would therefore be an inborn human characteristic, where acquisition is
not a choice, rather we are naturally susceptible to it (Lenneberg 1967). On
the contrary, learned behaviour being the cause of child language acquisition
would reflect an equally deterministic approach. Behaviourist Burrhus Skinner in
his 1957 ‘Verbal Behaviour’, claims linguistic behaviour is determined by
operant conditioning, a method of learning involving consequence, reward and
reinforcement.
By considering these perspectives,
it is clear to see that innateness depends solely on internal factors, whereas learning
behaviour, specifically language as a child, is described through the use of external
influences. This then assembles a notion of dependency, questioning whether these
theories support and rely on each other, benefit from the other, or work better
as acquisition tools individually. My discussion will be directed at claims that
all typical humans are born with an innate capacity for language. It could be
argued that this, however, does not wholly establish a child for a
linguistically stable, yet alone linguistically sophisticated life. Rather that
it forms the basis and onset for language. Learned factors therefore must
contribute to a baby becoming a language-bound child, to a child becoming a linguistically
capable and intelligible adult.
The Argument for Innateness
There is research in the linguistic
field, that indicates a child’s language acquisition could solely be reduced to
innateness. The Nativist argument expresses that humans are born with a
Language Acquisition Device, a biological organ for speech which holds
grammatically universal rules (Clark 2009). This is reinforced by the claim
that language is universal. Specifically, Steven Pinker’s 1994 ‘The Language
Instinct’ denotes the idea that across neurologically normal humans in society,
language is not only universal, but develops as a natural skill in all children.
This can be demonstrated through Pinker’s comparison to the acquisition of more
simplistic skills like farming or chess, which cannot develop without a teaching
process. One difficulty with this argument, however, is that perhaps if a child
were surrounded in an intense farming or chess-playing environment from birth,
much like the linguistically abundant environment a typical child is, perhaps
these skills would develop almost inherently as well. This therefore highlights
the question of whether language would acquire and progress without a social
environment and interaction; a language acquisition support system (Tomasello 1995).
A theory to counter the need for
such environment however, and support the innateness of child language
acquisition is the Chomskian notion that language is creative. There is an
undoubtable recursive nature to grammar, unique among communication systems, allowing
novel sentences to be offhandedly delivered and received. As human beings, we
are able to say new things, and understand new things all the time. Our
vocabulary is infinite, with open word classes allowing us to constantly add
new words, features and rules. The biologically-programmed capability to negotiate
these rules is named ‘linguistic competence’ (Chomsky 1965: 4), to which the seemingly
evolved and recursive rules allow for no limitations in the creativity of human
language (Pinker 1994).
Example
The above claims on child language
acquisition and its potential innateness can be supported by data evidencing
humans developing language, despite a lack of cultural transmission. This can
be seen in 1980’s Nicaragua, where a new sign language emerged from isolated
deaf children. It appeared these children were generating their own new
grammar, and “creating language” (Slobin 2004: 15). Individual deaf children
innovating linguistic forms ultimately displays a use of language that has not
been previously taught, discrediting child language as a learned behaviour. If
we completely dismiss external factors contributing to this acquisition
however, then we must assess internal causes, within the human mind and brain.
Research into rare mutations of genes,
specifically the heterozygous FOXP2, has shown causation to monogenic syndromes
defecting language. Those carrying this gene find difficulty in “complex
sequences of mouth movements”, resulting in “impaired expressive and receptive language”,
and general disorderly speech development (Fisher and Scharff 2009: 166). From
this research, we can infer that if a genetic mutation diminishes language
ability, then the undeviating gene could be necessary for normal development of
speech and language, and therefore the language acquisition of a child.
Connection
A gene responsible for language, as
well as the creation and acquisition of language amongst the deaf children of
Nicaragua, supports the claims that language acquisition is both universal and
creative. This also reinforces the idea that all languages, as well as our
internal linguistic systems and genetic make-ups, are equally complex. The idea
that all languages are equally complex, expands on the argument that language
acquisition is not a learned behaviour. Steven Pinker’s ‘The Language Instinct’
(1994), discussed the concept that languages conform to universal design, meaning
the ontogenetic development of language is universal. Despite different
cultures and societies having different rates of speed to which children
acquire language, the order of acquisition remains the same, an indicator that
language could be solely innate (Pinker 1994).
On the contrary, research
supporting an innate theory of language acquisition, like findings of the FOXP2
gene, do not entirely dismiss the presence of additional, external influences.
Fisher and Scharff’s article ‘FOXP2 as a Molecular Window into Speech and Language’ (2009),
highlights that when given “adequate environmental input”, a child will
normally acquire “highly proficient spoken language without conscious effort or
formal tuition”. Similarly, we can compare this to the deaf children of
Nicaragua, where it seems highly important to consider their environment. The
interactive community the children form when creating new meaningful signs, constructs
a highly social environment. This is therefore potentially acting as a key
factor in the creation and acquisition of efficient linguistic systems, and
cannot be dismissed.
The Argument for Learned
Behaviour
It is now important to consider the
possibility and claims that child language acquisition is a learned behaviour. For
learning to take place, a child would need to be surrounded in a socially
abundant environment, a framework for interaction, which can be labelled as a
‘Language Acquisition Support System’ (Bruner 1983: 112). Some methods of
learning stated in Bruner’s ‘Child’s Talk’ (1983) involve conversational
scaffolding and turn-taking, educational play and object-exchange between adult
and child. Through these types of interaction, children not only are thought to
learn language, but are presented with critical material displaying language as
part of larger systems of communication, helping make sense of others and making
themselves understood. It could even be argued that by learning when to talk,
what to say and how to respond to adult utterances, these conversational
exchanges could be a “forum for learning to become a member of their society
and culture” (Clark 2009: 6).
In order to further this argument,
we can direct our attention to a process in a child’s language acquisition,
specifically two-word utterances and beyond, acquired approximately at the age
of eighteen months. The syntax of children’s two-word utterances display
recurring patterns, and these are the same as those found in adult speech, typically
‘subject’, followed by the ‘object’. This default clause construction in
English, initially might suggest that the rules a child is following are
internalised, or embedded unconsciously within the mind. However, if we take a
look at some common examples of two-term relations, we can see that the
language is highly orientated towards the here and now, observation and action
(Brown 1973). Relations include, ‘daddy kick’ (agent + action), ‘sit chair’
(action + location), ‘me ball’ (agent + affected), all of which involve
environmental stimuli. These structures are established consistently in the
acquisition process, and however well argued that this is due to an underlying
biology and structure, it is questionable to assume that these relations would have
even been formed, without the external stimuli they are referring to: the
presence of agents, locations and actions within an environment.
Example
To expand on the suggested importance
of a linguistically abundant support system needed for children to learn
behaviours such as language, I will consider the data from academic journal ‘Language
Learning with Restricted Input: Case Studies of Two Hearing Children of Deaf
Parents’, (Sachs, Bard and Johnson 1981). This paper discusses the impacts of
children raised in a linguistically restricted environment, in comparison with
that of the average child. Two hearing brothers had received a lack of
communication, both spoken and signed, by their deaf caregivers. Findings show that
the eldest child Jim, had only been exposed to language indirectly, through
television, and had not acquired language. The nativist perspective is therefore
unsupported in this instance, as the child did not show evidence of having an
innate language acquisition mechanism or syntactic development, even in an
environment with limited language exposure, as suggested they would (Chomsky
1965; Lenneberg 1967).
The process of language acquisition
is therefore apparently more complex than an innate factor, or any indirect
linguistic stimuli, like speech heard from a television. Acquisition must occur
from direct exposure to linguistic forms in an interactional setting. This is
not to say however, that Jim was entirely non-linguistic. Jim had developed a
linguistic system, combined with paralinguistic features like invented gestures
to convey basic meanings. What was lacking in his language, however, was
patterns consistent with English, including many syntactic devices. Sachs, Bard
and Johnson therefore summarised acquisition as requiring two factors, the need
for expression of ideas as well as learning linguistic forms, which “depend on
the opportunities to acquire those forms” (Sachs, Bard and Johnson 1981: 51)
Connection
Therefore, it can be inferred that
if language were derived from only innateness, the children in the study above would
have developed language without limitation, nor difficulty. This can influence
the conclusion that a child’s environment, and behaviour learnt within this
environment during upbringing, has lots of influence on the acquisition
process. Neglectful or restricted linguistic environments, or a lacking in
teaching and education from a caregiver, can be detrimental to a child’s
linguistic ability.
It is also useful to consider the
caregiver role in a child’s language acquisition process, and how this can
support the argument that it is a learned behaviour. There are many features of
caregiver language or child directed speech (CDS), which show adults attune
their outputs to their child’s needs. Examples of this include the usage of
simple sentence structure, slower and exaggerated intonation, frequent use of
repetition, interrogatives, praise, and first-person plural pronouns in “shall we
get dressed now?”, as an example (Bruner 1983). These examples introduce the
question of why caregivers would bother adapting their speech to aid a child’s
learning, if the child were going to naturally acquire language anyway? By suggesting
a lack of independency, using “we” and “us” to offer help, suggests a child’s
need for teaching, which would only make sense to then apply to language
acquisition as well.
As the role of a caregiver has been
suggested crucial to children learning language, a child may begin to view them
as a linguistic role-model, and want to imitate their actions, and language. CDS
features like repetition, praise, and breaking down language to be shorter and
slower, could therefore become its own effective method of teaching. If a
caregiver were to use praise when a child used a preferred form of language, or
repeated the utterance correctly from the adult, this would essentially be
using methods of positive reinforcement and imitation to learn behaviour. This constructs
Skinner’s argument in ‘Verbal Behaviour’ (1957), claiming human behaviour is
determined by operant conditioning, involving imitation, consequence, reward
and reinforcement. It is only fair to observe however, that this behaviourist
position is not only deterministic, but reductive, and excludes the possibility
of innate, contributing factors.
The Argument for Both
Now having discussed how these
theories might apply in opposition, or individually, it is crucial to consider child
language acquisition being the result of both innateness and learnt behaviour,
in support and reliance on each other. The neurotypical human brain, in a
typical upbringing, will always be surrounded in a “human sociocultural
environment” (Slobin 2004: 17). This ultimately suggests that it is difficult
to separate the two perspectives entirely anyway, by researching them as
individual potential causes. I find it useful to distinguish some previously
discussed arguments, now in a way considering how these perspectives may
coincide, both contributing to a child’s language acquisition.
Language being creative was an
argument taken by the nativist approach, due to its recursive nature to
constantly construct novel sentences. However much like learning to paint, or
cook, or read, creativity can be learnt. Perhaps language acquisition only
seems like a native skill because from birth, a typical child is surrounded by speech,
rather than the other creative skills being introduced later on in a child’s
life. However, we can undoubtedly link language
acquisition to our minds, which would again introduce a concept of innateness.
Much like novel sentences being extendable and infinite, there is also no limit
to what we can think (Pinker 1994). Two concepts can be highlighted: ‘displacement
of reference’, the ability to think about things which aren’t present, and ‘semiotic
freedom’, we can have signs and words for anything we like, and can invent them
as we go. This suggests that speech can occur even without a direct
environmental stimulus. A child may therefore have an innate ability to
comprehend novel concepts within the mind, and through additionally learnt
material, can explore them further and use appropriate linguistic expressions
to discuss them.
Example
We can also observe the functional
connection between thought and language in John MacNamara’s psychological
review of ‘Cognitive Basis of Language Learning in Infants’ (1972). The paper
discusses ideas that without thought, language is ambiguous, and claims that
thought without language is useless. MacNamara then highlights this distinction
by introducing the concepts of meaning and linguistic code, theorising that the
period in which infants begin to acquire language, their “thought is more
developed than their language” (MacNamara 1972: 3).
McNamara’s research investigated
infants’ linguistic structures and their semantics, including vocabulary,
syntax and phonology. Hypotheses imply an innate ability to read meaning into
social situations, rather than having a built in Language Acquisition Device,
as previously suggested by Chomsky (Clark 2009). MacNamara uses ‘meaning’ to
refer to “intentions a speaker wishes to express” linguistically (MacNamara
1972: 2), and regards infants’ ‘sentences’ as “names for the intentions which
they express”, which may include references to the “physical environment” of
the child, or to their feelings, ideas or concepts as examples (MacNamara 1972:
3).
By infants using meaning as clues
to language, rather than using language to signify meaning (MacNamara 1972: 1),
both innate and learnt-behaviour perspectives are combined. Claims are made which
insinuate a child’s non-linguistic cognitive process, like thought and decoding
of meaning, are present before linguistic signals and learnt. However, it is
important to clarify that MacNamara does not suggest the infant’s have a
“ready-made set” of cognitive structures at birth (1972: 11), rather they are
gradually acquired when presented with a physical environment, suitable for
language acquisition.
Connections
It is also important to consider
that the field of Nativist linguistics, arguing that child language acquisition
is innate, lacks biological evidence to certain degrees. Building upon claims
made by MacNamara, there is no concrete scientific evidence like brain scans,
found for Chomsky’s Language Acquisition Device (Clark 2009). Similarly,
evidence for FOXP2 as a language and speech gene, even disputes that the human faculty
for spoken language is “built on multiple traits that predate its emergence”, where
its evolution is “unlikely to be explained in terms of a single human-specific
or brain-specific molecular agent” (Fisher and Scharff 2009: 166).
To support the idea that child
language acquisition cannot wholly be a learned behaviour either, Chomsky’s
concept of ‘poverty of stimulus’ in his ‘Rules and Representations’ (2005)
debates that children’s fast acquisition and few structural errors take place
before processes like imitation and reinforcement can. The theory suggests that
children apply particular grammatical rules at times they consider appropriate,
even when not taught to do so in that situation. This can be seen in a typical
child’s acquisition stage of three or more words, where devised hypotheses
account for regularities they hear. Logical mistakes like applying the regular ‘-ed’
past-tense verb ending to irregular dynamic verbs, for example, ‘I swimmed
there’, rather than the grammatically correct but irregular conjugation ‘I swam
there’. Rather than this proving an innate set of rules are already in place in
the child’s brain before a child’s linguistic outputs, it ultimately displays a
child’s ability to latch onto rules and regular structures. The appearance of
regression in linguistic ability, could be due to children learning one
grammatical rule at a time, and a gradual acquisition of linguistic structures,
explained as ‘operating principles’ (Slobin 2004: 74).
Conclusion
I can therefore conclude that both perspectives
arguing for child language acquisition as learned behaviour or to be innate
have been considered, and cannot be singular factors in the process. That is
not to state that these two plausible explanations are interchangeable, rather that
the presence of both are imperative to a child’s first language acquisition. Based
on the discussion of theory and data, I can assert that innate abilities may
provide the grounding and basis to acquisition, to which particular atypical
brains may not be able to do. This, in combination with factors surrounding a
child in a social environment, are key to the advancement and maturation of
language, where children with neglectful or atypical upbringings may have
inhibited or delayed language acquisition.
Further research into this area of
study would allow me to consider other internal and external potential factors
of child language acquisition, including the concept of Cognitivism. This would
draw upon language as both innate and a learned behaviour, highlighting
connections between language and schematic theory in the brain. In additional
exploration, it would be of interest to consider broader theories of acquisition,
including zones of proximal development, which explain the process of a learner
being guided into independency.
When assessing the linguistic
capacities of common chimpanzees, it is important to acknowledge that chimps,
much like other primates and early hominids, are a highly capable species.
Research has shown that the common chimpanzee is not only adaptable, but able
to communicate, having the capacity to express and understand emotion (Woodruff
and Premack 1979). These biological and behavioural phenomena tend to function
coincidingly with a capacity for language (Premack 1971). Therefore it is also important
to consider the extent to which common chimpanzees may have intelligence,
creativity and orders of intentionality as well. By distinguishing these as
features which can constitute language, it is then useful to differentiate
these from features found in a chimp’s natural communication system, and methods
of how a chimpanzee may acquire human language. This also highlights the
evolutionary question of whether a chimp would require a linguistic capacity in
their natural habitat, and therefore have the anatomical capacity to produce
vocalisation or speech like humans.
My discussion will be directed at
specific theories and research projects which either support or counteract the
argument that the common chimpanzee retains some linguistic capacity. This will
be specific to when a chimp is encultured in a socially interactive
environment, particularly a “human child environment” (Gardner and Gardner 1989:
8). However, it must be clarified that even in controlled, linguistically rich
environments, chimps’ linguistic capacities are restricted by various factors
to be discussed. The argument can consequently be made, theorising that a
common chimpanzee born and raised in its natural habitat, would never learn nor
produce language. A chimpanzee may be highly communicative, and even possess a
human’s means of intelligence, but may not be considered a linguistic being.
Project Washoe:
Writing in the
wake of, and in response to a Chomskian theory on language, Gardner and Gardner
conducted ‘Project Washoe’, discussed in ‘Teaching Sign Language to Chimpanzees’
(1989). Noam Chomsky’s nativist approach states that linguistic behaviour is a
natural biological phenomenon, and most specifically, confined to the human
species (Premack 1970; Chomsky 1965). In agreement to this claim, Gardner and
Gardner hypothesised that “any form of behaviour, human or animal” exists
innately, including the teaching of sign language to chimpanzees, whilst
disputing the Chomskian claim that language is restricted to the human’s domain
(Gardner and Gardner 1980: 287). The project was therefore designed as a modern
attempt to teach human language to chimps.
Before the
project could begin, various measures needed to be taken into consideration to ensure
Washoe the chimpanzee had a fair assessment of her linguistic capacity. Due to
a common chimpanzee’s concluded lack of appropriate vocal apparatus, and restricted
range to produce human English phonemes, the Gardners’ used a form of American
Sign Language, ‘Ameslan’. This satisfied all the defining criteria of a fully
structured and referential language, simply a “human language that did not
require human speech” (Gardner and Gardner 1989: 5). The project also attempted
to replicate a human child environment performing typical parental activities, where
the most critical aspect was the stability of a long-term foster family
relationship (Gardner and Gardner 1989: 8).
After 51 months of training, a total of 132 Ameslan
signs had been acquired by Washoe, as well as the creation of eight new signs. One
specific example was the creation and usage of compound noun, ‘water bird’,
when pointing to a swan, a creature she had never seen before. In addition to
the significance of Washoe presenting linguistic creativity to novel concepts,
the correct use of word-order shows knowledge of correct syntactic structure
(Gardner and Gardner 1989: 281). The nativist notion that language is creative
derives from a linguistic perspective studying human child language acquisition,
and as a sign of linguistic capacity. The recursive nature to grammar allows
for an infinite vocabulary with open word classes, enabling novel sentences to
be offhandedly created and understood (Pinker 1994). This was perceived to be
unique to human language and distinguishable among the symbolic activities of
other species, until the findings produced by Project Washoe (Limber 1977:
282).
Washoe’s use of
lexical creativity and syntactical accuracy initially points to a linguistic
capacity when analysing her innovative language use. However, upon deeper
analysis we can decipher whether ‘water bird’ was the first novel “multimorphemic
word formed by a non-human primate”, or whether Washoe was “simply
acknowledging” the sighting of both a bird, and the water it swam upon (Libben
2006: 1). The impressive claim of Washoe creating novel human language and
using correct syntax can also be diminished by comparison to the language
development of a human child, where a typical three-year-old child’s use of
complex sentence structure could surpass the most developed chimp’s language usage
recorded (Limber 1977: 284).
Despite claims of
Washoe’s linguistic capacity being unsupported, it is difficult to dismiss that
important and intelligent behavioural processes are still seemingly occurring. We
can apply the behaviourist principles of child language acquisition to explain
Washoe’s impressive acquisition of 132 Ameslan signs. When producing a correct
sign, Washoe would receive a form of positive reinforcement from her
caregivers, Gardner and Gardner. Instead of praise being used as an effective
method as it would for a human child, Washoe received food and treats. According
to Skinner’s argument in ‘Verbal Behaviour’ (1957), a human child imitates a
caregiver’s correct utterance or preferred form of language, repeating it, and
then receiving positive reinforcement. This ultimately claims typical human
behaviour is determined by operant conditioning, which constructs the
Behaviourist theory of language acquisition. We can apply these principles to Washoe,
who may be imitating, and repeating Ameslan signs observed from her caregiver,
to which she receives food to reinforce her correct language use. By inferring
a chimp’s behavioural acquisition is based on a copying process to receive
reward, it can be claimed that their linguistic capacity is therefore lacking
the true understanding needed to constitute language. This does however reflect
an intelligence, where chimpanzees can learn to communicate in ways which seem human-like
or language-like. There is a natural and
instinctive desire present for common chimpanzees to look for signals and cues,
which would indicate danger or a threat in the wild. This can explain why
Washoe has the ability to figure out messages Gardner and Gardner are trying to
convey. Due to the existence of prevalent complex communication systems of
chimps in the wild which will later be discussed, there is no evolutionary need
or purpose for language. This does however show that chimps are highly
adaptable when placed in a human environment.
Project
Nim:
‘Project Nim’, conducted by Herbert
Terrace and discussed in ‘Nim: A Chimpanzee Who Learned Sign Language’ (1980), follows
common chimpanzee Nim Chimpsky and whether he could learn American Sign
Language. Terrace’s initial theories were in correlation to the Gardners’, with
predominantly anti-Chomskian views that language is not human bound, and can be
learnt. With a similar methodology to Project Washoe, Nim was taught ASL like a
child, raised in a human, social environment. Rather than replicating them, Terrace
aimed to develop upon previous projects surrounding chimps and language, and
introduced concepts of intentionality, a feature considered key to language.
First-level intentionality is when an animal is thought to have a mind, “freely
controlling whether or not it will impart information” (Premack 1976: 676). At
the second level, the animal has the knowledge that other beings also have a
mind, and can “recognise it has control over information and be able to infer
that others, like it, have a similar capacity” (Premack 1967: 676). As well as
discussing a chimp’s intentional capacity, Terrace also compared the potential
linguistic capacity of chimp to that of
a human child. As Terrace began to reveal many discrepancies in the project, it
was argued that the language ability of an ape was far different to that of a
human.
Initially, Project Nim presented
high statistical findings of syntactically correct signs, with 78% of two-sign
combinations containing ‘give’, having ‘give’ in first position, and 83% of
transitive verbs combined with ‘me’, having the transitive verb in first
position (Terrace 1980). On the surface, this appears as evidence for Nim’s
understanding of language, and the importance of correct word-order and
structure, rather than simply learning syntax. However, when comparing Nim’s
linguistic progress with the typical stages of child language acquisition, a
significant dissimilarity suggests perhaps no linguistic capacity is prevalent.
One critical finding was in the sentence length of Nim’s signs, where the mean
sentence length did not increase with age, as it would in cognitively normal
human children. On average, the lengthier sentence types were also no more
complex than shorter ones, and often with high degrees of repetition, where
child language development involves features such as premodification and
embedding, to enrich the language used. The examples of repetition within a
signed sentence, also show a lack of spontaneity, where the proportion of
imitative utterances would normally decrease with a human child’s age, but seemed
to increase with Nim’s. As well as countering the behaviourist view, this
ultimately shows a lack of progress and development in Nim’s linguistic ability.
It is useful to distinguish the
variety of ways in which Nim’s use of signing as a whole can be interpreted.
There is no instance within Terrace’s research project, where the chimpanzee ceases
his interspecies communication. Despite the content of Nim’s signing
occasionally being redundant, his use of signing satisfies the teacher’s
demand, leading to reward and positive reinforcement. It is an intentional
debate, to discuss whether or not Nim has the capacity to understand this is
what the teacher wants, wanting him to sign and communicate, which would
exhibit potential for second-order intentionality. The opposing argument would
claim Nim knows he would receive a reward if he correctly signs, eliminating
the presence of thought for the other person and what they might want. Despite
this not directly providing evidence for linguistic capacity, the behaviour is
undoubtedly intelligent, particularly if we consider the possibility for
second-order intentionality. It is fairly stated that humans often infer that
higher animals have intentionality, and can express emotion (Woodruff and
Premack 1979: 360), as one would with their pet, as phenomena associated with
higher biological creatures. Research has previously denied the possibility for
intentionality outside the human species, but “the present paucity of evidence
makes such dismissals inadvisable” (Woodruff and Premack 1979: 334).
The final point of high
significance within Terrace’s research project which needs to be considered in
order to truly assess the linguistic capacities of common chimpanzees, is to
recognise that Nim is one chimpanzee, much like Washoe was, in very unusual
circumstances.
The Linguistic Capacity of a
Typical Chimpanzee
Both the Gardners’ ‘Project Washoe’
(1989) and Terrace’s ‘Project Nim’ (1980), produce unrealistic representations
of the linguistic capacity of a typical, common chimpanzee. The research projects
were controlled participant observations in artificial laboratory settings, specifically
designed to be linguistically abundant. The findings therefore lack
generalisability, which causes a struggle when applying them to chimps in
natural, wild environments, or even those in captivity and zoos. The intensive
nature of the studies, with all behaviours being recorded and analysed,
similarly is unnaturalistic and bias, where it is most likely in these
settings, over anywhere else, that a chimpanzee would show signs of linguistic capacity.
It is crucial to recognise that
relatively “simple animals” can learn “seemingly complex concepts with great
facility” if the materials are “relevant to their environments” (Rumbaugh and
Washburn 2003: 7). In a common chimpanzee’s natural environment however, signals,
vocalisations and gestures are “innate, involuntary, unidirectional and
immutable” (Terrace 2019: 172). The functions of communication are simply
primal and instinctive, whilst also more seemingly more developed than lower
animals, including encountering a mate, finding food or fighting a threat, but
also expressing emotions such as joy, fear, and anger (Terrace 2019: 172). With
specific training and conditioning as seen in the research projects, common
chimpanzees can acquire and use symbols and gestures which resemble human
language. However, this is only imperatively, and in order to gain a reward. It can be argued that language would “never
develop” if that were its only function, and therefore the majority of
chimpanzees, in the wild or typical captivity, would not acquire a linguistic
capacity (Terrace 2019: 137).
A Chimpanzee’s Complex
Communication System
Despite arguably not being
inherently linguistic, it is important not to disregard the remarkable communicative
capacities of chimps, and their varied and complex systems of communication. Communities
of wild chimpanzees live in fission-fusion societies, temporarily separated
into groups of individuals or subgroups to carry out tasks and maintain order,
but reunite with recognition and maintain long-term relationships. This
structure means that communicative complexity is essential, as different social
relationships must be established and maintained with every unique character in
the chimpanzee community. Adult chimpanzees, on average, have 49 different
gesture types, referring to voluntary movements of different body parts to
signal different meanings and mutual goals, and including visual, tactile and
auditory gestures. A great variety of gestures is crucial, ensuring the
chimpanzee can respond appropriately to particular gestures, facilitating an
effective social interaction and preservation of relationships (Robert et al
2019).
Undoubtably, a common chimpanzee is
a highly capable and intelligent creature, but these notions do not prove linguistic
capability, nor linguistic intelligence. It is clear that chimpanzees rely on
gestures to communicate, shown in both wild and natural contexts, and in the
research project’s use of sign language. A defining feature of typical human
linguistic capacity, which must be considered however, is the ability to
produce speech. Premack’s ‘Language in Chimpanzee’ (1971: 808) states it is
still open to question whether Chimpanzees have the necessary “neuromuscular
structures” to produce human speech, where it has been claimed that a chimp’s vocalization
is “highly resistant” to modification in this “otherwise highly educable
species" (Gardner and Gardner 1971; Premack 1971: 808). I find it difficult
to dismiss this possibility entirely however, as pre-human primates and early
hominids were non-linguistic and without suitable vocal apparatus to produce
speech. This is not reflective of modern, evolved Homo Sapiens, and an
undisputed linguistic capacity.
Debating the Evolutionary
Potential for Chimpanzee Language
From comparisons made between wild
chimpanzees, and those raised in artificial linguistic environments, we can see
a notable difference in linguistic capacity. This highlights the question of
whether a rich linguistic environment is needed for an evolutionary potential to
be considered in the common Chimpanzee. The process of enculturation is claimed
to be essential to human language acquisition (Savage-Rumbaugh 1986), where the
hallmarks of the way we speak to young children crucially being applied
similarly to young chimps. These include a steady stream of nonverbal cues,
attention directing manoeuvres and repetition, all required as well as spoken
language.
It is useful to correlate human
language evolution patterns to predict a potential future linguistic capacity
for common chimpanzees. Archaeological
finds from preserved remains of early hominids, show a lack of right-angled
anatomical structure between the vocal apparatus and mouth, which is the key to
a modern human’s biological ability to speak (Christiansen and Kirby 2003: 6). These
findings from early hominids align similarly to a modern chimpanzee’s anatomy, which
allow them to produce only high-pitched vocalisations, with limited vowel
sounds (De Waal 1988). It is also beneficial to refer to other, biologically
comparable primates like Bonobos, which are considered ‘proto-linguistic’, and
on the verge of language (De Waal 1988). Making linguistic comparisons
is highly effective, due to the similar nature, characteristics and habits of
these primates, where much like chimpanzees and bonobos, early humans would typically
be hunter-gatherers, returning to share food with a large social group. A
specific example, a Homo-Neanderthal, had a larger surface area of brain than
the modern Homo-Sapiens (Christiansen and Kirby 2003: 6), arbitrarily
more intelligent, and yet were not known to be linguistic. It could be argued
that homo-sapiens, with a confirmed self-awareness and ability to share
knowledge through language, may have out-survived the Neanderthals due to this
enhanced method of communication, and were therefore better at adapting to new
environments (Christiansen and Kirby 2003). We can consequently infer, that through
years of evolution and change, common chimpanzees may adapt to a resembling form
with a developed anatomical and linguistic capacity.
This introduces the question of
whether there is actually an evolutionary need for a common chimpanzee to
develop an efficient linguistic capacity. It could be claimed that language
would work as a replacement tool for grooming or gestures, communication
methods only accessible and achievable in smaller social groups. The purpose
being to aid social bonding and define social relationships, which constitutes
for 90% of language usage in modern humans (Dunbar 1996: 67). Theories suspect language in early hominids accordingly
evolved, facilitating the need for social cohesion in larger group sizes;
historical understandings we can apply to a possible future for common
chimpanzees.
Conclusion
It is fair to conclude that for now, and until a global change requires a necessity for linguistic evolution, the common chimpanzee has no need to produce natural language, nor can assumedly do so. If raised as a species they are not naturally designed to be, immersed in a human interactive environment, elements of linguistic-like behaviour are evident, and it is no doubt that the common chimpanzee is highly sociable and communicative, even in inter-species relationships. A chimp in its natural habitat, will likely maintain habits typical of its surroundings and sociality, which despite complex and seemingly intentional, do not present linguistic capacity.
For Further Reading...
Project One:
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Chomsky, N. (1965) Aspects of the Theory of Syntax.
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Chomsky, N. and Hornstein, N. (2005). Rules
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Clark, E.V. (2009) ‘Acquiring Language: Issues and
Questions’, First Language Acquisition, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press: pp. 1-19
Clark, E.V. (2009) ‘Is There an Innate Language Acquisition
Device’ , First Language Acquisition, Cambridge: Cambridge University
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Fisher, S.E. and Scharff, C. (2009) ‘FOXP2 as a
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Lenneberg, E. H. (1967) Biological Foundations of Language.
New York: Wiley.
Locke, J. (1975) An Essay concerning Human Understanding,
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MacNamara, J. (1972). ‘Cognitive Basis of
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Pinker, S. (1994): The Language Instinct. London:
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learning with restricted input: Case studies of two hearing children of deaf
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Skinner, B. F. (1957) Verbal Behaviour. New York:
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Slobin, D. (2004) ‘From Homesign to Nicaraguan Sign
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Tomasello, M. (1995) ‘Language Is Not an Instinct’, Cognitive
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Project Two:
Chomsky, N. (1965) Aspects of
the Theory of Syntax, Cambridge: MIT Press
Christiansen, M. H. and Kirby, S. (2003)
‘The Archaeological Evidence of Language Origins: States of Art’, Language
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Dunbar, R. (1996) Grooming,
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Premack, D. (1976) Language and
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Roberts, A. I. Chakrabarti, A. and
Roberts, S. G. (2019) ‘Gestural Repertoire Size is Associated with Social Proximity
Measures in Wild Chimpanzees’, American Journal of Primatology, Available
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repertoire size is associated with social proximity measures in wild
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Savage-Rumbaugh, E. S. (1986) Ape
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